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The Greek Economy and European Integration 
Dr Panayota Leandros 
Abstract 
The process of European integration involves the accelerated socio-economic convergence of member 
countries. But the weight of a country’s cultural characteristics can weigh heavily on its development. 
Thus, the social division of labour in Greece reveals quite exceptional characteristics, among them the 
survival of a small, fragmented peasantry, the large incidence of independent forms of work, and the 
persistence of  overburdened public employees. It is therefore normal that, in this respect, the 
convergence of the country with the European norm encounters socio-cultural resistances. The 
construction of Europe is an unprecedented historical process. This is an unprecedented social 
experiment aimed at the sustainable integration of several independent countries into a new common 
economic and political space. We are therefore faced with a project that has major, even radical, 
consequences. It is true that the fundamental social principles of the member societies are not called into 
question. But the creation of the new common space supposes the establishment of truly original 
institutional and ideological forms. The original and unpredictable nature of this process is therefore 
obvious. 
This is the first time in history that it is planned to gradually integrate democratic countries with 
democratic means into a new democratic entity. Thus, the construction of Europe goes through a 
political process that must continue in stages in the context of a ‘democratic gradualism’ that must be 
invented and reinvented. Insofar as the historical sensibilities of the national components of the new 
ensemble will have to be respected, this consensual gradualism is undoubtedly necessary. 
But it is precisely this that consists of the congenital ambiguity of the current experience. The 
exceptional historical peculiarity of this process of integration therefore consists in the inescapable fact 
that the ‘original social contract’ of the new European society is not given and promulgated once and for 
all, but is subject to constant consensual renewal. In this historically unprecedented context, the issue 
around the modes and implications of this integration is all the more crucial because it cannot go 
through constraining central interventions. Nevertheless, this does not imply that member countries will 
always be subject to determinations freely chosen by the representatives of their inalienable political 
sovereignty. It is the very opposite that is true, as evidenced by the emergence of the new contradictory 
conception of a ‘two-scale democracy’. This is not, of course, without effects: in a context where the 
deep meaning of concrete forms of sovereignty has not yet been established, the common progress, the 
goal of all democratic politics, must be defined before that the new collective subject is definitively 
crystallized. The known is thus diluted in the unknown. In this respect, therefore, the change is 
necessarily brutal: the prospective cohesion of Europe can only go through a series of radical breaks 
with regard to the fundamental representation of the imaginary subject of general interest. This can 
only lead to changes affecting all the ideas that underpin the political phenomenon. 
This being said, it becomes clear that the absolute priority assigned to the integration process imposes a 
significant shift in collective representations regarding the meaning and strategies of continuous social 
intervention. From now on, all the reforms put in place by the national political authorities must be 
presented as tending to the construction of an entity that remains imaginary. The implications of this 
are important: there can no longer be any question of a political will that has freely and sovereignly 
opted either for a particularistic national evolution or for a simple automatic reproduction of social 
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structures, values, models of behavior and traditional social regulation norms. Hence the emergence of 
the new key concept of ‘convergence’ of all the national components, not only on the institutional and 
economic level, but also and perhaps especially on the ideological, normative and symbolic level, in 
short ‘social’ level.  In this context and by necessity, the collective representations of political time and 
social priorities seem in their turn profoundly modified. 
Inevitably, the political and economic deadlines of the Community are decided on a common calendar. 
Thus, the decisions taken in the countries concerned are subject to the constraints of a “temporal 
externality” that is almost inexorable. Confronted with the requirements of convergence, the internal 
political authorities therefore seem more and more incapable of defining their tactics according to 
changing circumstances. This implies that, from now on, a whole series of crucial decisions can no longer 
afford the luxury of being deferred in time. In this respect, therefore, the process of European 
integration is like a race against time, which, while imaginary, is nonetheless invasive. 
Hence the tendency of the political authorities to resort at all times to the deadlines imposed by 
external community logic. Hence also the emergence of a new type of techno-political authoritarianism 
that aims precisely to thwart any inertia and resistance to the process of integration. Hence the fact that 
most social issues are increasingly present as objectively induced from external ‘integrationist’ 
constraints. Europe as a whole must accept the risks and perils of a rapid leap forward in the single path 
of homogenization. 
The urgency of a radical convergence therefore seems unavoidable. The essence of “community 
discipline” is in fact on this incredible ‘integration radicalism’. In this context, all other considerations 
now seem to have to bow to the binding priorities of institutional reforms. The so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’, of which there is more and more question, manifests itself in the first place through this 
‘community emergency’, which is less and less negotiable by the parties concerned. This is the first time 
that old societies have been subjected to a desire for change that can no longer take into account their 
historical peculiarities. This entails a whole series of displacements in the meanings. I will mention only 
one which seems to me fundamental. Indeed, the dominant political discourse now establishes a radical 
and operative distinction between ‘social’ and ‘cultural’. Everything about the first one should be 
submitted immediately to the external requirements of convergence. In sharp contrast, national 
‘cultures’ should be able to evolve autonomously. The projected homogenization of companies does not 
extend to the forms of a subsystem that is now conceived as independent of the social infrastructure.  
Thus, at a single stroke, a series of fundamental meanings, internalized over a long history, is 
questioned. A distinction that hitherto seemed impossible and idealistic takes center stage in the 
dominant political discourses: paradoxically, the creation of a common social community can only be 
thought of in to the extent that we accept the safeguarding of a ‘particular national culture’. Ironically, if 
the Volksgeistherderian was once used to found the will for unlimited national independence, it is now 
the historical relativization of this independence that is rationalized by the idealization of the 
conservation of national cultural genius. The fantasies of radical social autonomy that stemmed from 
the recognition of unique nations thus seem otherwise out of date, at least out of place. In this sense, 
while constantly intervening more and more in the structure of the social for the purpose of 
convergence, States must at the same time insist on the conservation of national cultural particularities. 
But politics is thus stolen from some of its most effective weapons. In terms of essential national 
particularities, on the other hand, it is stolen from the possibility of negotiating under the circumstances 
with the fragile balance between stability and change in the "socio-cultural" area. The "social" now 
becomes a "sphere" erected as an explicit object of urgent political intervention. It is, therefore, an 
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evolution which seems to deny the usual liberal principles: it is a fact that the construction of a single 
Europe seems to require a radical intervention in the elementary forms of social organization. However, 
this political priority attributed to convergence at any price can only lead to unpredictable, random, 
sometimes even "perverse" social effects. In its eternal cunning, history always tends to distort any form 
of political voluntarism, be it simplistic or sophisticated. Especially since among all thinkable forms of 
intervention, those that deal with the deep structures of the social seem the least controllable. It is a 
fact that, in any case, the formal democratic consensus on the major political options can not in any way 
affect the direction of the evolution of cultural and symbolic practices: the sociological gravities and the 
ideological immobilisms never disappear in the deadlines predictable. Thus, even if, from now on, the 
notion of "society", as it has been known for two centuries, seems deprived of some of its immemorial 
symbolic attributes, there are still considerable margins of "resistance" to the above. Living societies 
evolve not in spite of but because of history; but that does not preclude their insistence on progress not 
because of reason, but in spite of their appointed planners. 
Especially since, in the current situation, the concrete imperatives that seem to stem from community 
emergencies are not the result of political choices that have been the subject of systematic negotiations 
between the parties concerned. After a first period marked by fierce controversy, the Directorate-
General for European Construction now seems to be in place. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that priorities are largely subject to the uncontrollable developments of the international system. The 
dominant free trade auspices thus seem to have sealed not only the general meaning of the common 
European policy but also the concrete modalities and rhythms of the current integration. There is no 
doubt that the main explicit concern of the architects of the European Community is the promotion of 
the economic competitiveness of the new space in the global environment. At least since Maastricht, 
the idea of a social Europe that took into account the peculiarities, sensitivities and immobilisms of the 
partner countries seems to have literally evaporated. It is therefore not a coincidence that Community 
constraints and emergencies focus first and foremost on the protection of economic and monetary 
stability. From now on, any divergent social considerations should therefore bow to the decisions 
promulgated in Frankfurt. The internal social policies of the member countries will have to adapt to the 
omnipotent reality.  These external constraints obviously concern all countries participating in the 
common European construction (Kirrane, 1994). But they do not concern them all to the same degree. 
From the outset, we have already insinuated, the priority of "convergence" at any price leads to the 
possibility of "adverse effects". And this is especially true in countries that already have significant 
differences from the average. In this context, the very notions of "divergence" and "convergence" are 
not without ambiguities. The performative "criteria" of Maastricht refer primarily to the nominal 
quantitative convergence of economic, monetary and fiscal criteria. However, the economy cannot 
function otherwise than in a continuous interpenetration with the social fabric. In this sense, even if the 
process of economic integration is conceived at first sight on the basis of measurable indices, real 
convergence could only be consolidated through the modification of a whole series of ideological, social 
and cultural traits. Some of the most important, long-lasting and interesting ones are sometimes those 
that resist quantification. 
In this perspective, the performance of the Greek economy, which is quite honorable, should not 
overshadow the fact that the evolution of certain aspects of the country's social, ideological and cultural 
structure is still particularly divergent with respect to developments in other European countries. It is 
from some of these spectacular peculiarities of Greek society that the following text will be discussed. 
No doubt, the question is of fundamental importance. The well-founded hope of the Greeks to reduce 
or even eliminate the "welfare gap" that separates them from nationals of other European countries has 
not only been achieved by accelerating economic performance indices in the short and medium term. . 
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On the contrary, whether "desirable" or not, the long-term evolution of the integration process should 
depend mainly on transformations of productive social activities, prevailing norms and values, common 
aspirations and patterns of behavior.Iin short, practical repercussions of the evolution of a collective 
imaginary that is as complex as it is inconceivable. 
The essence of the analysis that follows will therefore be to try to identify some of the most important 
significant structures. Let us say from the outset that there is obviously no question of following in a few 
pages the social history of a country with geographical and cultural features that may seem unique in 
the European area. Indeed, located as it is in the Balkan space, modern Greece is a predominantly 
orthodox country without belonging to the Slavic cultural and linguistic area. In addition, the millennial 
Greek language currently survives only among Greeks, and their Cypriot counterparts. It should also be 
remembered that the bitter memories of the Ottoman past only exacerbated the millennial cultural and 
national opposition of Greek Orthodox Christianity to the infidel world of Turks and Muslims that 
dominates the Levant. Finally, the geographical and cultural distance separating Greece from Western 
Europe can not diminish the ideological relevance of the permanent but nevertheless contradictory 
symbolic links which are supposed to unite the "cradle of the European idea" with the appointed 
representatives  of this "transhistorical" Western civilization. To these historical and cultural 
peculiarities, one should also add a more recent "accident of course" which has sealed the destiny of the 
country since the middle of the last century: indeed, from the end of the civil war of 1946-1949, Greece 
was the only non-communist country in southeastern Europe. 
Installed now in the "Western" liberal capitalist system, Greece will evolve in a direction imposed not so 
much by its internal social and cultural dynamics but rather by its particular geostrategic role. This fact 
only contributed to the exacerbation of the internalisation of Greek "exceptionalism". Thus, from now 
on, to the traditional cultural incompatibility which juxtaposed the country to all its immediate Balkan 
neighbors, was added an unconditional political and ideological opposition. Certainly, after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the Balkan space has been reconstituted within the general framework of the liberal 
globalized capitalist system. But this did not contribute to closing the huge social and economic gap that 
separated a "developed" and "westernized" "Greece" from those formations that are still in their 
"transition state" painfully uncertain. It is therefore not a coincidence that the Greeks still think of 
themselves in terms of a "nation without brothers". 
In view of all this, the fact that the development of Greek society has followed the particular paths 
seems perfectly normal, if not inevitable. In this respect, therefore, I will concentrate mainly on the 
evolution of the social division of labor, by isolating some salient features which seem to me particularly 
exemplary. I think that this choice is entirely legitimate: even if the division of labor in any society 
answers a whole series of causes and determinations that are necessarily deeper, it can nevertheless 
reveal, if only in an indicative way, the particular features of a social ensemble as regards the modes of 
reproduction of its daily material life, indicating in passing certain aspects of its class structure. This is 
the reason why, at least in modern societies, the taxonomies of forms of social work acquire a 
fundamental importance. From this perspective, which is therefore necessarily limited, I will focus on 
three main aspects: 
 Despite its profound transformations over the last half-century, Greece continues to be a largely 
agricultural country. It is true that the proportion of farmers in the entire working population, still in the 
majority until the 1950s, reached 40% in 1970, and is now reduced to less than 20%. Thus, just as it was 
the case in most of the previously agricultural countries in Europe, mass rural exodus was the most 
important structural social mobility movement in Greece in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Indeed, by leaving rural areas in large numbers, it was the rural people who were at the base of the 
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rapid growth of the urban population, and especially of the Athenian agglomeration (Burgel, 1974), 
which has quadrupled its inhabitants since 1950 , today grouping more than 40% of the entire 
population of the country. It is also they who provided the bulk of the enormous wave of emigration 
abroad, and especially to the Federal Germany of the Wirtschaftswunder   a wave that in the space of 
twenty years has affected almost 40% of young farmers. 
However, that does not prevent that, compared to all the other countries of the Europe of 15, the Greek 
peasantry remains by far the most numerous in relative terms. The notion of "end of the peasants" 
announced by Henri Mendras (1984 [1967]) about France, but also more and more relevant as regards 
Italy, Spain and Portugal, does not seem to be able to apply in Greece, at least for the moment. So, in 
spite of the continuing rural exodus and the spectacular growth of agricultural productivity, traditional 
family structures are still omnipresent in a campaign that could still be considered as "overpopulated" 
and "traditional". . Thus, and apart from the multiple and complex reasons which explain its still visible 
"resistance", Greek family farming is still dominated, as it has been for a long time, by small parcel 
properties dispersed in space. Despite its rapid mechanization, and in sharp contrast with most other 
European countries, agricultural production in Greece has not advanced in the path of concentration 
and capitalization. At least with regard to the dominant structure of export units, the system seems to 
have reproduced itself on the basis of its traditional features. 
 The recent evolution of the non-agricultural labor force presents even more striking peculiarities. On 
this level too, I will first of all stress a very exceptional structural feature. Indeed, more than any other 
European country, Greece seems to distinguish itself by a general "resistance" to all forms of wage-
earning. Despite demographic trends similar to those prevailing in Western Europe, despite the rapid 
growth of the urban population and irrespective of rapid and sustained economic development, the 
proportion of wage earners in the total population Currently, the percentage of employees seems to be 
"stabilized" at a very low level (Burtless, 2002, pp. 478-479). By way of comparison, it should be noted 
that even a quarter of a century ago, there was not a single European country in which the non-
agricultural payroll rate did not exceed 75% of the labor force, the average being between 88 and 92% 
(OECD, Historical Statistics). Henceforth, a conclusion is necessary: to the extent that it accepts that the 
dominant model of the highly "developed" developed countries constitutes a general characteristic of 
the process of "modernization" and "rationalization" of production, the employment structures in 
Greece are still insufficiently "developed". 
In addition, it should be noted that these trends "generally resistant" to salaried employment seem to 
be found in all branches of activity, without exception. Indeed, while it is completely normal for self-
employment, including caregivers, to represent almost all (in this case more than 97%) of those 
employed in fragmented farming still organized on traditional bases, On the contrary, it is quite 
remarkable to note that self-employed self-employed persons continue today to represent 30% of 
assets in manufacture, 36% in construction, 56% in commerce and 54% in the hotel industry (Eurostat, 
on the database provided for the years 1999 and 2000 by the Greek Statistical Office). Everywhere, 
therefore, in industry as well as in services of all kinds, the share of small individual and family 
enterprises is still particularly high. It is even likely that, in reality, the "self-employed" are even more 
numerous: in fact, given the prevalence of undeclared and underground economic activities, estimated 
in the 1980s to produce one-third or so of gross national income. And also taking into account the fact 
that the official rates of reported male activity appear to be very low, it may be thought that a 
significant fraction of the undeclared working population organizes its survival activities. in the context 
of "quasi-family" underground enterprises in which the available labor force is thus incomplete. Not 
having led to a significant reduction in the absolute number of family businesses (Damianakos, 1999: 
78), the rural exodus, although massive, did not result in a definitive break in the links of the former 
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peasants. agricultural production. Thus, in a sense, the process of urbanization appears in some respects 
to be incomplete and even reversible in the short term, at least in terms of the individual 
microstrategies of the self-employed. This testifies to the persistence of an "agro-urban continuum", 
organized and reproduced around the family apparatuses which, as we shall see later, continue to play a 
fundamental social role in the dominant strategies of the self-employed. 
 Finally, a third unusual feature of the Greek employment structure is the central importance of public 
employment. On this point also, the origins of the phenomenon are old. Throughout the nineteenth and 
early decades of the twentieth century, Greece saw its structures develop around a vast state apparatus 
which, given its limited resources, seemed utterly disproportionate in comparison with other European 
countries This trend was even reinforced after the First World War, the public employment offer having 
served to stabilize a population threatened by the massive nature of an economic and social crisis 
exacerbated by the sudden influx of one million and a half of refugees from Asia Minor after the Greek-
Turkish war of 1922. A generation later, during and just after the civil war, the social role of state 
employment was accentuated even more: it was quite normal that in the face of total political and social 
insecurity, the authoritarian nationalist state use excessive devices under his immediate control in order 
to consolidate his direct political domination over the employees who depended on them for their 
survival. In fact, it was precisely during this period that a significant part of the wealthy strata destroyed 
by the war could have stabilized and even strengthened its social position through the privileged 
occupation of the new positions opened in an administration already characterized by the swelling of 
these higher echelons (Langrod, 1965). From then on, it would seem that the subsequent evolution was 
traced in advance: after 1950, one after the other, successive governments, including the military junta, 
knew how to use the weapon of mass public hiring to extend or consolidate their political and electoral 
influence. Inevitably, despite the dramatic transformation of the country, political dependencies were 
quickly reconstituted and even strengthened, thus sealing the particular type of "political culture" that 
will be the subject of countless studies on the phenomenon "clientelist"). This does not prevent that, 
under the given conditions, the structures of power have acted in all logic. By keeping under their direct 
control not only the administration, but also the educational apparatus, hospitals, health services, 
energy, transport, communications and a large part of the banking system, the summits of the 
Authoritarian state have transformed public-owned apparatus into vast political mechanisms of hired 
massive u. In fact, the direct control of a large part of the economic surplus offered the political 
authorities enormous power to control the populations. As a result, at least in the cities, and even more 
so in Athens, the preponderance of public employment has become almost total. 
It was exactly in this context that the "statolatry" characteristic of contemporary Greek society was 
consolidated. The dependence of a significant part of the population, and especially its most educated 
fraction, on state favors seems to be a "structural constant" of the post-war social evolution. For a long 
time, only the state seemed to be able to guarantee the beneficiaries of its selective "benevolence" 
long-term security, favorable working conditions, almost certain advancement, and even a modest, 
secure old-age pension. In the long run, however, the most significant effect of quantitative swelling 
continues state employment is that the "public labor market" now imposes its imaginary terms on the 
entire labor market. Even though, in a first phase, it was developed in the face of persistent stagnation 
of the private sector, state employment has had long-term effects on all employment structures. 
Indeed, it was in the face of this massive employer state that the generalized fantasies of possible access 
to stable and protected jobs against and against any social and economic situation were crystallized. The 
public labor market thus tended to juxtapose itself radically with the norms typical of a private capitalist 
market. Instead of functioning as a mere component among others in the depersonalized process that 
determines the general meeting of demand with the supply of the labor force, the "public labor market" 
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has been completely empowered in this way which concerns not only the imposed forms of "work ethic" 
but also individual strategies.  
Therefore, it is normal for the standards of behavior and the values of the "privileged" public employees 
to be formed in a context that results from the representation of this job as a personalized "situation" 
pension to which one could legitimately aspire while patiently playing the game of political clienteles. 
On the level of the collective imagination, and with the obvious exception of the nationals of the ruling 
class, the attraction exercised by a "clientelist" employer-state, which seemed largely indifferent to the 
productivity of its employees, was therefore almost universal. 
I summarize: the most distinctive features of the evolution of the working structures of Greek society 
are the preservation of a still large fraction of the traditional small peasantry, the spectacular 
"resistance" of so-called "independent" urban the numeric, but above all the ideological and cultural 
importance of public employment in the broad sense of the term. 
If only in a negative way, one conclusion is necessary: the productive wage-earners of the private sector, 
that is to say of the category which is supposed to offer capitalist societies their inimitable dynamism, 
remain relatively underdeveloped. The recent history of Greece is therefore marked by a largely atypical 
employment structure. The following table summarizes the trends just mentioned. On the basis of the 
foregoing, the dynamics of the social structure seem to be trapped in patterns that are literally counter 
to the evolutions that have taken place in most capitalist countries developed for at least fifty years. But 
that's not all. In "horizontal" social divisions, one should add a "vertical" aspect which seems to have 
played a fundamental role in this dynamic. These include the school system, and the general function of 
education, which in Greece also has quite unique aspects. Indeed, at least in some respects, even more 
than the general division of social work, it is the modes of constitution of the ruling classes which are at 
the base of collective representations. Thus, it is important to note that while the relative share of public 
employment in relation to the general labor market is already significant, its dominance becomes truly 
enormous within the particular market of candidates with study qualifications. In the 1980s, the state in 
the broad sense employed between 70% and 90% of tertiary graduates, depending on the branch which, 
moreover, explains the already mentioned fact of a hypertrophied administration, especially at its 
higher echelons. If we take into account the fact that, during the post-war period, the student 
population has skyrocketed, reaching, in the 1980s, rates similar to those of the major European 
countries, this attractiveness of the public service was total. 
However, if, as we have seen, the statist destination of the general flow of intergenerational mobility is 
at the base of the statolatrie characteristic of the country, its specific provenance testifies to the 
penetration of the fetishization of public employment in the country. a population still predominantly 
peasant. In these conditions, it is normal that the real, but above all imaginary, access to higher 
education has been of a very extraordinary symbolic importance. In this respect, the developments in 
Greece are atypical compared to other advanced capitalist countries: at the end of the 1980s, the 
category of higher education graduates includes, in astonishing proportions, nationals of the "lower" 
social categories, and more particularly the fragmentary peasantry. It is therefore clear that the 
phantasy of access to secure public employment does not concentrate, as in other countries, among the 
nationals of a petty bourgeoisie threatened with extinction. On the contrary, the general cult of 
education seems to be accentuating in the social strata which are most pushed towards mobility at any 
price. It is therefore certainly not a coincidence that the difference between the various social categories 
as regards their chances of having access to higher education seems to be, in Greece, much less 
pronounced than elsewhere. If the distant origins of Greek "ideological egalitarianism" are perhaps to 
be found in the lack of a feudal past, this phenomenon has only been repeated and reinforced through 
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the particular social role of an education, which opened to the lower classes vast prospects of vertical 
mobility. 
Admittedly, the phenomenon is not new: from the nineteenth century, the opening of innumerable 
positions in the Mediterranean periphery dominated by the Greek petty bourgeoisie had contributed to 
the fact that higher education is distinguished by particularly "democratic" modes of recruitment. 19, at 
a time when, in general, the role of direct reproduction of class relations by school apparatus was rarely 
questioned. 
In this sense, the generally "open" dynamics of the Greek social structure seem to be at the root of a 
whole series of collective behaviors manifested by the limited incidence of the typical forms of "class 
fatalism" that are often found in more crystallized class societies. It is certain that the structures of the 
imaginary are never formed arbitrarily. In the final analysis, family planning for intergenerational 
mobility could only be based on realistic aspirations. 
But there is more: aspirations for public employment explain the special structure of educational and 
professional specializations. Until very recently, the Greek university continued to be dominated by law 
and humanities studies, which corresponded to the qualifications generally required for open positions 
in public administrations of all kinds. The dominance of public employment thus seems to have been 
responsible for the generally "unproductive" orientation of the majority of candidates. It is therefore not 
a coincidence that this "statist" orientation marks especially the students who come from the less 
privileged layers. It is quite normal that prevalent forms of social mobility determine educational options 
on a massive scale especially among those for whom public employment was an end in itself. 
In this sense, the fundamental role of family planning in intergenerational mobility seems to have had 
contradictory effects. On the one hand, the real or imaginary debouches open to the lower classes and 
especially the small peasantry led to a real fetishization of a formal education which seemed to open the 
way to the quasi-ensured social promotion. This is why private investment in education has reached 
almost unheard-of proportions in Greece (Lambiri-Dimakil, 1974). 
In all social classes, M families seemed, and seem always ready to sacrifice everything to finance the 
education of their children, if any abroad. On the other hand, this same process has led to a significant 
"distortion" of much of the "human capital" that might otherwise have functioned as a lever for 
"normal" capitalist development. The combination of the importance of self-employment and generally 
unproductive public employment has therefore led to a relative scarcity both for the "production 
lieutenants" needed to set up large productive units and highly skilled technicians in modern science 
and technology. Although the situation seems to have changed in recent years, it is a fundamental social 
problem that still needs a solution. 
On the basis of what has been said, Greece appears to have been endowed with employment structures 
quite resistant to the current forms of capitalist development. This makes it all the more surprising its 
nominal "economic and social" performances, which, at least until the mid-eighties, seemed to be truly 
miraculous. Indeed, there is no doubt that, barely a quarter of a century after the end of the civil war, 
the image of the country has been completely transformed, at least as far as the ostensible level of 
everyday life is concerned. From the outside, therefore, Greece seemed to have escaped the misery of 
underdevelopment in the immediate aftermath of the war. In this respect, some figures are really 
impressive: between 1961 and 1977, the cumulative growth in private consumption per capita was of 
the order of 142%, by far the highest among the European countries. The process was also 
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uninterrupted: while the military junta had led to the brutal end of democratic political life, economic 
and social development remained spectacular. 
Especially since the leap forward in daily life as it appears from the official data could fish on the side of 
underestimation. Taking into account the income generated in the underground economy, estimated, as 
we have seen, at 30 or 35% of the national product, it is easy to explain why the consumption capacities 
of a significant fraction of households skyrocketed (Karapostolis, 1975). 
We cannot dwell on the factors, obviously too complex, that underlie these spectacular first-sight 
performances. Let us once again mention the importance of the social safety valve represented by the 
massive emigration flow of the 1960s. Let us also note the fundamental role of tourism receipts, 
remittances from emigrants and merchant marine revenues that have one part allowed to redress a 
balance of payments balance still in deficit, on the other hand to substantially increase private liquidity 
of external origin which in turn led to the reinforcement of a host of dependent or independent 
microactivities. Finally, let us remember the fact that, in this exceptional context, the social 
repercussions of economic evolution still seemed controllable if not globally positive: despite the 
exacerbation of income inequalities (Karayiorgas, Pakos, 1986: 273), in the 1960s and 70, the endemic 
unemployment of the immediate post-war period had almost disappeared and the traditional absolute 
poverty seemed reduced to controllable pockets (Germidis, Negreponti-Delivani, 1978). 
But that does not prevent that after a brief phase of industrial expansion in the 1960s, productive 
development seemed to reach its limits, especially after the crises of 1971, and even more so in 1973. 
From then on, the overall dynamic Greek social formation seemed to be running out of steam, so much 
so that one could speak of "growth without development". It was becoming increasingly clear that the 
country needed profound structural changes. It was precisely in this ambivalent context that the social 
protection measures that followed the takeover of power by the PASOK of Andreas Papandreou 
intervened. As early as 1981, the new socialist government enacted a series of measures aimed at the 
more egalitarian redistribution of income and the gradual establishment of a welfare state. 
In a climate of general optimism, Greece's social development seemed finally to be able to adjust to the 
visible state of its economic growth. From now on, social justice, which had been totally neglected by all 
the right-wing governments that have been successful since the end of the civil war, was at the center of 
political concerns. 
It was only a mirage, however. It soon became clear that under the new conditions the relative stability 
of the economic growth rates of the 1960s and 1970s could no longer be sustained. Once again, history 
has been tricky: by revealing the political conditions necessary for the creation of the social state only 
from the moment when economic conditions were no longer met, the dice of a history still eventful 
seemed immediately loaded. Especially since the effects of the unfavorable world situation were being 
felt at the very moment when the country was facing the most important challenge in its history: that of 
its integration into a European system, which seemed, too, to have to face the growth crisis. In this 
context, then, the painful structural adjustments seemed necessary. Greece's European perspective was 
to control rising inflationary pressures, stabilizing public finances as a permanent deficit and reducing a 
threatening public debt in many respects. Under these conditions, the unfavorable development of 
economic constraints operated in the same direction as the implicit and even explicit pressure of the 
European authorities. Redefinition of priorities in economic policy could not wait long. 
111 
 
Thus, the economic and fiscal austerity measures introduced in 1985 herald a change of course which 
was found to be a definite expression in the even more draconian policies introduced in 1995. At the 
same time, the growth of posts in the civil service was limited. 
Thus, macroeconomic trends were quickly reversed. Indeed, in recent years, inflation has been 
controlled, public finances cleaned up and external debt reduced. At the same time, despite the 
downturn, we are witnessing a significant recovery in growth rates. At first glance, the immediate goals 
of the clean-up operation therefore seem largely accomplished. Even in extremis, Greece could boast of 
conforming to the severe economic and financial criteria adopted in Maastricht (Kirrane, 1996). Thus the 
country has been integrated into the monetary system of the European Union as a full member. Revived 
since the 1960s, the ancient dream of the Greeks to be recognized as partners in the "civilized" and 
developed European space has finally come true. 
Nevertheless, the take-off of economic indices does not mean that Greece has become a "modern" 
capitalist country like the others. Indeed, if it is sometimes possible to improve the performance and the 
quantitative indices of development after systematic interventions in the daily operations of economic 
life, the "society" is always more resistant to any inclination reformist. Even though they are supported, 
modernizing efforts are unable to transform, at least in the short or medium term, dominant values, 
current behaviors and individual strategies often based on past experiences. Thus, despite the fact that 
the slogan of "modernization" seems to have penetrated the discourses of almost all Greek political 
staff, its meaning and its social implications remain less clear. Especially since the improvement of the 
economic performances was accompanied by a clear deterioration of a social situation which did not 
present until then insurmountable contradictions. 
Whether or not it was "necessary", the modernizing austerity policy has had predictable overall effects. 
It is no coincidence that for the first time in 40 years, the unemployment rate now seems to be 
stabilizing between 10% and 12% 24. It is also normal that, at least for the last ten years, a large part of 
wages in both the public service and the private sector have stagnated and even declined in real terms, 
as the remuneration of labor has not generally been able to productivity gains. Nor is it surprising that 
the recent government project on the general reform of the social insurance system and on the change 
of the old-age pension system has led to an unparalleled popular mobilization for at least twenty years. 
In short, income inequality, which had declined slightly in the 1980s, appears to be worsening to the 
point where it has reached unprecedented levels. Finally, one should consider the ideologically 
destructive effects of the sudden onset of almost one million "economic immigrants" from decaying 
neighboring countries. It is not surprising that despite appearances, the majority of Greeks seem to be 
less and less assured of its future. 
Thus, to summarize, current social developments seem at first sight contradictory, paradoxical and in 
some respects opposite to the preceding period. Not long ago, there was still talk of the viability of 
almost miraculous growth without development, which was largely due to the economic opportunities 
offered to a still anachronistic society with regard to its employment structures his work practices. In 
this exceptional context, the phantasy of the cultural "synthesis" between the West and the East 
seemed to be able to materialize on the social level by a no less fantastical compatibility of a social 
structure directly derived from the exceptional situation of the immediate afterlife. -war with the new, 
ruthless constraints of a globalized capitalism of liberal obedience. 
In sharp contrast, in the current situation, it would seem that employment structures, dominant forms 
of social mobility, internalized behaviors and individual and family strategies still operate against the 
constraints of external objective constraints. By "taking revenge", so to speak, of an economic system 
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that has been able to reproduce for a long time without visible harmful effects, society seems to be in 
permanent imbalance: a considerable fraction of the peasantry, the self-employed and the job-holders. 
The public does not seem to have survival solutions other than those of clinging to their former 
situation. 
Especially since the type of development currently prevailing focuses on productivity growth rather than 
an increase in the number of employees. It is thus unlikely that a considerable expansion of private 
enterprises could lead, in predictable terms, to the spectacular increase in demand for labor, which, 
moreover, is still insufficiently qualified. A significant part of a whole generation of workers may 
therefore be caught in a spiral which seems to lead either to further degradation of their means of life or 
to even greater social and economic marginalization. And this at the same time that the youngest, even 
the most educated, seem to find more and more difficulties to integrate into a changing labor market. 
In these circumstances, the question asked at the beginning concerning the modalities of accelerated 
convergence of European countries appears in a different light. Indisputably, in the long term, the social 
dynamics of each country will be determined by the ability of the new generations to rise to the 
challenge of new challenges in a world that seems, at least for the time being, to be in line with the 
demands of the world, a globalization based on the unbridled antagonism of all its national and regional 
components. This is why reform of education systems seems to be at the center of all national political 
concerns. From this point of view, the possible prospects for Greece could have seemed relatively 
favorable. Indeed, if they managed to reproduce in this entirely new context, the particular "traditions" 
in this field could prove of paramount importance. A country which, as we have seen, has for a long time 
invested everything in social promotion through access to training devices could well continue along the 
same path. Nevertheless, nothing is less certain. It is normal that the current restriction of career 
prospects has a direct impact on aspirations. Indeed, a whole series of partial indices suggests that we 
are witnessing a profound transformation of collective representations with regard to both individual 
and family strategies. The fact that the imaginary outlets are either abroad or in the public services are 
compromised cannot fail to have serious repercussions on the development of strategies and 
mentalities. All indications are that Greece is in a deep crisis of "adaptation" not only to its "economy" 
but also to society as a whole. 
Thus, in the short and medium term at least, the augurs do not seem favorable. Greece is currently in a 
pivotal situation, which can be summed up in the increasingly acute contradiction between the urgent 
external constraints imposed by the process of European integration and the effects of its own on the 
one hand social and ideological immobilisms. It therefore seems obvious that even if the Greek political 
authorities have no other option than to increase their systematic interventions in the social sphere, 
these interventions may come up against growing resistance. Of course, the necessary reforms would 
have been easier if they were accompanied by new job opportunities. It is precisely this preoccupation 
which underlies a whole series of measures which concern both the forms of organization of 
employment and the modes of regulation of work. However, the necessarily short deadlines imposed by 
the European calendars pose problems that seem difficult to solve in the immediate future. 
Thus, the political dilemmas seem unavoidable: if we want to avoid the real threat of uncontrollable 
explosions, the implementation of radical reforms should be accompanied by measures that take into 
account the complexity of a conjuncture that presents itself largely like a flight to the unknown. But this 
question is not only about Greece. Indeed, it is precisely in this context that the political and social 
options of Europe as a whole should eventually be subject to a more general revision. In so far as the 
long-term social and symbolic integration of the European area seems to be the necessary condition for 
the success of the current historical experience, it is necessary to take into account the destructuring 
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and sometimes perverse effects of a policy which imposes brutal interventions in social tissues. We can 
therefore think that, in the long run at least, the dream of a social Europe, which could provide a new 
example to a world that is increasingly torn apart, can only be achieved by redefining centralized 
community operations in favor of less burdensome, less bureaucratized and more open to the social 
reality of member countries. 
Otherwise, it is likely that relentless resistance to traditional social fabric with modernizing constraints 
will be reproduced on larger and larger scales. If it is therefore generally accepted that, at least 
symbolically, Europe cannot be built otherwise than by respecting the inimitable "cultural" 
particularities of its members, it should also be understood that, if it aspires to be alive, "culture" can 
never be established as an independent parameter: in fact, the national cultural traditions, which one 
would like to safeguard at any price, are, at least in part, only the mediatised reflection of the historical 
particularities and social that we would like to make disappear under the acronym of "convergence". 
This is not the least of the contradictions of the evolution of a European integration that does not seem 
to know yet on which foot to dance. 
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